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Resumo
Este trabalho intenciona examinar efeitos econômicos da liberalização brasileira de políticas comerciais 
introduzidas durante os anos iniciais da década de 1990. Os efeitos no Brasil, como em muitos outros 
países seguindo reformas parecidas, tem sido contenciosos. O período em questão foi de tumulto ma-
croeconômico seguido por estabilização bem-sucedida, e diversas políticas foram implementadas às vezes 
simultaneamente, tornando-se analiticamente difícil separar e isolar os vários efeitos. O trabalho examina a 
evidência existente sobre o crescimento da produtividade do País e utiliza também um modelo computável 
de equilíbrio geral (CGE) em simular os efeitos de mudanças em política comercial. A análise sugere que 
as reformas nas políticas comerciais resultaram em ganhos significativos de bem-estar para o País.
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This paper seeks to examine economic effects of Brazil’s trade policy liberalization in the early-1990s. The 
effects in Brazil, along with those of many other countries pursuing similar reforms, have been conten-
tious. The period in question was one of macroeconomic turmoil followed by successful stabilization, and 
various policies were pursued sometimes simultaneously, rendering it analytically difficult to separate out 
various policy effects. The paper examines the existing evidence on the country’s productivity growth and 
employs a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the effects of trade policy changes. 
The analysis suggests that the trade policy reforms resulted in significant welfare gains for Brazil.
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1 BackgRound and contExt
The effects of trade policy liberalization have been contentious in nearly every coun-
try where such policy reforms have been implemented.  This has been especially the 
case in Brazil, where many observers have pointed to Brazil’s unique characteristics 
and large industrial base and have argued that Brazil should be treated as a special 
case. The advent of a trade policy liberalization program, initiated with the Collor 
Government in 1990, has been controversial, with proponents of the reforms ar-
guing that effects would be beneficial and opponents contending that the removal 
of protection, instead of promoting growth and efficiency, would bring about a 
significant reduction of industrial output and overall employment. The objective of 
this paper is to contribute to the analysis of the economic effects of the trade policy 
liberalization.
With the passage of a number of years since the trade liberalization program began 
in 1990, the accompanying availability of relevant data and more advanced analyti-
cal techniques more systematic analysis can now be undertaken of the effects of the 
program in Brazil.  This analysis is potentially important in two major respects. 
First, it should contribute to the general understanding worldwide of trade policy 
liberalization with an important case study for Brazil. Second, the study can provide 
evidence from the Brazilian experience to enrich the policy debate currently existing 
in Brazil.  
Much of the analysis of Brazil’s trade policy liberalization has focused on its employ-
ment effects. Several scholarly studies cite adverse employment effects, suggesting 
that an overall adverse effect emanating from the partial trade policy liberalization.1 
Other authors have focused on the partial equilibrium analysis of trade balances 
and production by sectors (e.g., MOreira; COrrea, 1997). it should be noted 
however that the trade policy changes did not occur in a vacuum. Other important 
economic events were also taking place at the same time, primarily including grow-
ing macroeconomic instability followed by successful stabilization. Macroeconomic 
policies, it will be argued below, went far in short-circuiting the economic effects 
of the trade policy liberalization. To obtain a better appreciation of what happened 
with the liberalization, holding other factors constant, general equilibrium model-
ing (CGe) techniques have been employed to simulate the effects of the trade policy 
changes enacted by the Brazilian Government in the early 1990s.
in the remainder of this paper, Section ii presents a discussion of the evolution 
of Brazilian trade policies. Section iii offers a discussion of some of the observed 
1 See, for example, Barros et al. (2000), Carneiro and arbache (2002) and Moreira and Najberg (1997). 
We further compare our modeling approach and results with some of those papers.
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effects of the trade policy liberalization; two major effects are briefly discussed: 
(a) changes in productivity and (b) disappointing export performance. Section iV 
presents a discussion of computable general equilibrium models of the type to be 
employed in the present research project. The rationale for using a CGe model for 
the research is spelled out, along with a description of the model employed and its 
calibration. results of the policy simulations are presented.  Section V offers some 
concluding observations. 
2   thE EvolutIon of BRazIlIan tRadE PolIcIEs
restrictive trade policies were a major component of Brazilian economic policies 
during the postwar period up to the early 1990s. industrialization was promoted 
through heavy protection, while agriculture suffered policy discrimination. The 
overall incentive system to promote industrial growth included a number of different 
policy instruments adopted during different periods, including exchange controls, 
multiple exchange rates, direct and indirect fiscal subsidies and credit subsidies. 
The most prevalent set of policy instruments however entailed import restrictions, 
which protected domestically based producers in the Brazilian domestic market by 
sheltering them from foreign competition. Such import protection in the 1980s, 
by international comparisons, was both heavy and extensive. as a result of this 
protection, the Brazilian economy was among the world’s most closed economies, 
with many noncompetitive sectors and low productivity growth. Overall economic 
policies imposed a significant anti-export bias.
Table 1 presents data on the Brazilian tariff system by sectors over the period 1966 
to 1989.  The period 1966-73 experienced a modest liberalization in trade policies 
(with some evident economic gains), to be reversed however as a result of the po-
licy response to the first petroleum shock in 1973. Tariff averages reverted to their 
1966 levels, despite some changes within the manufacturing  sector. For most of the 
1980s tariff levels continued to be very high, with the average manufacturing tariffs 
amounting to 99 percent in 1980 and 90 percent in 1984.  Towards the end of the 
decade there was initiated a gradual, but important, tariff liberalization, reducing 
average manufactured tariffs to 51 percent in 1989, with the all product simple 
average being 50 percent.  
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taBlE 1 - avERagEa  noMInal taRIff RatEs,B 1966-89
Sectors/Industries 1966 1973 1980 1984 1989
Agriculture 53 34 53.8 57.3 29.0
Mining 27 22 27.0 16.7 24.8
Manufacturing
  Non-Metallic Minerals & Products 79 52 107.5 98.7 44.8
  Metallurgy 54 40 54.3 72.8 46.7
  Machinery 48 38 56.3 62.1 51.6
  Electrical Equipment 114 56 101.9 115.9 54.5
  Transportation Equipment 108 43 101.9 115.9 52.2
  Wood Products 45 66 125.3 101.1 32.9
  Furniture 132 76 148.2 169.9 44.9
  Paper 93 49 120.2 82.2 37.2
  Rubber 101 65 107.3 101.7 64.4
  Leather 108 73 156.6 135.2 51.1
  Chemicals 53 22 50.3 34.2 42.3
  Pharmaceutical Products 48 21 27.9 42.2 43.4
  Perfumery, Soaps, etc. 192 48 160.5 184.4 76.5
  Plastics 122 44 203.8 164.3 61.7
  Textiles 181 91 167.3 161.6 84.0
  Apparel 226 106 181.2 192.2 82.1
  Food Products 82 73 107.8 84.2 42.9
  Beverages 205 131 179.0 70.5 78.1
  Tobacco Products 193 141 184.6 204.7 88.8
  Printing and Publishing 122 35 85.5 71.1 34.1
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing 104 42 87.0 136.5 60.2
    Manufacturing Average: 99 57 99.4 90.0 51.2
Notes: a. The average tariff is calculated as a simple mean over the relevant tariff line items in the tariff 
schedule. b. includes surcharges.
Source: reproduced from estimates presented in Braga (1992). 
Growing out of some analytical work begun earlier, the trade policy reform began 
in 1988 on the basis of proposals made by the Tariff Policy Commission (comissão 
de Política aduaneira, or CPa).  The number of special import regimes was redu-
ced, some surcharge taxes (the iOF and the TMP) levied on imports were ended, 
and tariff peaks and average tariffs were indeed reduced. This hesitant tariff reform 
however was pursued in such a way as to have little effect on imports or on the pro-
tection afforded to domestic producers through Brazil’s elaborate incentive system. 
Tariff peaks were reduced, but the system of non-tariff barriers remained in place.
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in 1989 explicit nontariff barriers included an extensive list of quantitative import 
restrictions, covering 21 percent of all items in the tariff schedule, as indicated in 
Table 2. at the core of this byzantine system was the then infamous annex C of 
CaCeX, an extensive list of (supposedly) temporary import prohibitions. The 15 
percent coverage of all tariff line items understates the importance of these restric-
tions. The import prohibitions covered many major products (including all automo-
biles, most apparel products and nearly all household appliances). They covered 36 
percent of all consumer goods. Such coverage guaranteed that there would be little, 
or no, effect from reducing tariffs. For example, in the case of tobacco products, the 
average tariff was reduced from 205 percent to 89 percent in 1989, but the actual 
importation of all tobacco products remained strictly prohibited. initially, the tariff 
reform beginning in 1988 was mostly for show. it nevertheless was a good stepping 
stone for the more sweeping trade policy reform that was soon to come. 
Beginning in early 1990 with the Collor administration trade policy liberalization 
was pressed more forcefully. import programs negotiated at the individual firm 
level by CaCeX were abolished. The number of special import regimes was further 
reduced. importantly, nontariff barriers were drastically pruned, with only a few 
remaining for reasons related to public health, national defense and environment. 
With the elimination most non-tariff barriers, the centerpiece of the trade policy 
reform then became a revamping of tariffs.  a program for tariff reduction, to be 
introduced over a period of four years, was initiated in early 1990.2  The objectives 
of the program were to achieve a nominal tariff mode of 20 percent by 1994, with 
effective tariff rates for industry also approximating 20 percent.  Products with a 
clear comparative advantage were to be set at zero percent, with agricultural pro-
ducts have rates of 10 percent. Products that used inputs having zero rated tariffs 
were to carry tariffs of 10, 15 or 20 percent. imports of other products were to be 
taxed at 20 percent.  Some exceptions in the form of more generous tariff protec-
tion had to be made however in the case of computer-related products (35 percent), 
electronic products and appliances (30 percent), some chemicals (30 percent), and 
automobiles and trucks (35 percent).  The timetable for the tariff reductions was 
adhered to.  By 1994 average tariffs had been reduced to 11.2 percent, as observed 
in Table 3. While substantial reductions between 1989 and 1994 occurred across 
the board, relatively high nominal tariff protection has persisted for transportation 
equipment (e.g., automobiles, buses and trucks), machinery, basic chemicals, apparel 
and dairy products.
2 For a good discussion of the tariff liberalizing program’s design, see Kume and Patrício (1988) and 
Kume (1996).
Est. econ., são Paulo, 39(1): 59-88, jan-mar 2009
64 Brazilian trade Policies
taBlE 2 – covERagE of ExPlIcIt non-taRIff BaRRIERs, 1989
No. of Tariff 
Positions
% of Tariff Positions Subject to Restrictions
 Industry Prohibited
Other 
Restrictions
Total 
Restrictions
  Mining 174 0.0 1.1 1.1
  Non-Metallic Minerals & Products 331 8.5 0.0 8.5
     Ceramic Products 36 38.9 0.0 38.9
     Glass 134 10.5 0.0 10.5
     Others, nec. 161 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Basic Metals 620 1.1 26.3 27.4
     Iron and Steel 341 0.0 37.0 37.0
     Non-ferrous metals 279 2.5 13.3 15.8
  Metal Products, nec. 672 20.4 18.3 38.7
  Machinery 1276 5.1 4.9 10.0
  Electrical Equipment 617 21.6 9.2 30.8
  Transportation Equipment 354 33.1 0.0 33.1
  Wood Products 194 3.6 0.0 3.6
  Furniture 37 67.6 0.0 67.6
  Paper 199 14.1 0.0 14.1
  Rubber 93 10.8 0.0 10.8
  Leather 110 36.4 0.0 36.4
  Chemicals 2276 0.4 1.9 2.3
  Pharmaceutical Products 773 0.4 1.8 2.2
  Plastics 143 6.3 0.0 6.3
  Textiles 1030 43.0 0.0 43.0
  Apparel 168 83.3 0.0 83.0
  Food Products 896 9.7 0.0 9.7
  Beverages 126 15.1 0.0 15.1
  Tobacco Products 15 100.0 0.0 100.0
  Printing and Publishing 65 27.7 0.0 27.7
  Miscellaneous Manufacturing 588 49.3 0.0 49.3
Averages:a
   Agriculture 477 9.0 5.0 14.0
   Manufacturing 11336 15.8 6.0 21.8
       Consumer Goods 3764 36.3 6.0 42.3
       Intermediate Goods 5038 4.6 7.5 12.1
       Capital Goods 2434 7.5 11.0 18.5
     Whole Economy 11987 b 15.3 5.9 21.2
Notes: a. Unweighted averages.  b. aggregated data. Total tariff line positions = 12,443.
Source: reproduced from estimates based on information contained in a tarifa aduaneira brasileira (São 
Paulo, agosto 1989) and presented in Braga and Tyler (1992). 
William tyler, angelo costa gurgel 65
Est. econ., são Paulo, 39(1): 59-88, jan-mar 2009
taBlE 3 – noMInal and EffEctIvE taRIff PRotEctIon, 1990-2003 
(%)
Nominal Tariff Rates Effective Tariff Protection Rates
Year
Simple 
Average
Standard
Deviation
Simple
Average
Weighted 
Average 1
Standard
Deviation Maximum
1990 30.5 14.9 47.7 37.0 60.6 351.1
1991 23.6 12.7 34.8 28.6 36.5 198.3
1992 15.7   8.2 20.3 17.7 17.2   93.5
1993 13.5   6.7 16.7 15.2 13.5   76.5
1994 11.2   5.9 13.6 12.3   8.4   27.7
1995 12.8   7.4 17.1 10.4 19.5 113.8
1996 13.0   8.7 19.9 14.3 37.2 217.5
1997 15.6   7.6 21.6 16.6 29.6 177.0
1998 15.5   6.6 20.2 16.2 21.3 129.2
1999 14.9   7.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2000 14.1   6.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2001 14.6   6.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2002 13.0   6.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
 2003* 11.9   8.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Notes: 1. averages weighted by value added. n.a. not available. * preliminary data as related to the Common 
external Tariff  of MerCOSUL, with some adjustments made for Brazil. For the years since 2003, 
the calculation of Brazil’s nominal average tariff has been complicated by the obfuscated nature of 
Brazil’s exceptions to the CeT. The mean for 2003 may also be an underestimate. 
Sources: Kume, Piani and Souza (2000) for 1990-1998 and authors’ calculations from the tariff schedules 
for 1999-2003. recent information is available on the SeCeX website (www.desenvolvimento.
gov.br).
effective tariff levels were also reduced dramatically during the same period. The 
average effective tariff rate, weighted by value added, fell to 12.3 percent by 1994. 
it is this measure that best reflects the effects of tariff policies on economic activity 
processes and the pull of resources into those protected domestic market sales activi-
ties. at the beginning of the tariff liberalization process, the most heavily protected 
sectors were automobiles, textiles, apparel, and some manufactured food products. 
By the end of the trade liberalization process, effective tariff protection was reduced 
to the 20 percent range for most sectors. Only in the case of automobiles, trucks, 
buses and motorcycles is the rate of effective tariff extremely high – i.e., 129 percent 
in 1998.3 
accompanying the trade liberalization were some important institutional chan-
ges. Most significantly, CaCeX – the powerful trade control agency – was disban-
3 Kume, Paini and Souza (2000) have estimated detailed effective tariff rates based upon nominal tariff 
rates. 
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ded, with its functions redefined and farmed out to other government agencies. 
Such an action was consistent with the market-based reforms being pursued by the 
Government and other institutional restructuring within the Government during the 
early 1990s. a number of other government regulatory bodies were closed, inclu-
ding the Brazilian Coffee institute and the Brazilian Sugar and alcohol agency.  a 
privatization program for the extensive public sector enterprises was also initiated.
Tariff levels reached their lowest point in 1994. Beginning with the initiation of 
the Plano Real in mid-1994 there began a process of modest reversal and slight re-
trocession in the trade reforms. Between 1994 and 2002 the average tariff rate was 
increased from 11.2 percent to 14.6 percent in 2001, before falling to 13.0 percent 
in 2002. For the average effective tariff rate there was an increase from 12.3 percent 
in 1994 to 16.2 percent in 1998. (Table 3) 
Despite the partial backsliding of the trade policy reforms, Brazil is still much bet-
ter off than earlier, but its protection levels are still high when compared to other 
countries.  This puts Brazil at a disadvantage in contesting export markets and in 
providing incentives for export production. Moreover, during the past seven years 
other countries, including Brazil’s competitors, have gone forward in reforming 
their trade regimes and consolidating those reforms. Chile, for example, has gradu-
ally lowered its uniform nominal tariff to 6 percent in 2003. Singapore and Hong 
Kong both have zero tariffs. These advances elsewhere have occurred while Brazil 
has drifted backwards.  The reasons for the observed retrogression seem to include: 
(a) balance of payments pressures originating from the increased currency overva-
luation, which in turn stemmed from the Plano Real and lasted until 1999;4 (b) the 
marshalling of traditional protectionist forces (which were caught by surprise in 
1990); and (c) pressure coming from neighboring Mercosul countries.  The failure 
of exports to grow substantially after the trade policy liberalization provided argu-
ments for interested parties to partially abandon those efforts – irrespective of the 
stronger economic argument that the currency overvaluation had short-circuited the 
expected export response.  Notwithstanding the slight erosion of the liberalization 
program, most observers have cited substantial productivity increases as a result of 
the liberalization, as will be discussed in the below in Section iii.
Present trade Policy Posture.   Present trade policies are tempered by Brazil’s mem-
bership in and ambitions for Mercosul. a common external tariff (albeit with many 
exceptions) exists for Mercosul, and this constitutes an argument for pursuing trade 
4  in a recent study by Sarath rajapatirana, empirical evidence was presented from a number of liberaliza-
tion episodes indicating that if real currency depreciation did not accompany the liberalization there was 
a tendency to reimpose import barriers and restrictions. The general lesson is that for trade liberalization 
to work accompanying real devaluation must occur, especially if protection had been used to bolster an 
overvalued exchange rate. See rajapatirana (1995).
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policy initiatives as a part of the regional bloc. import restrictions center around 
tariffs, as discussed above. in the past several years, little overall change has occur-
red.  While the Government by and large has held the line with respect to nontariff 
barriers after their drastic reduction, noted above, in the early 1990s, some slippage 
on economic protection grounds can be observed.  For example, presently quotas 
exist for the import of textile products from Taiwan. 
another area of possible import restrictions relates to unfair trade practices, in-
volving anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and protection against the use of export 
subsidies.  The Brazilian anti-dumping legislation is based on that existing in the 
United States. as in the US case, such legislation is frequently used as a justification 
for relief from uncomfortable foreign competition. The arguments to apply such 
anti-dumping actions, initiated by producers or their representatives, have found 
sympathetic ears within government. in actions such as these there is a tendency to 
ignore consumer interests, and the recent Brazilian experience proves no exception. 
as possibly to be expected with the initiation of such procedures, the number of 
anti-dumping cases has grown in recent years. in the three-year period 1998-2000 
in 23 cases remedial measures were applied, as opposed to 12 for 1991-1993.5 
Some export restrictions also exist as a part of the current trade policy posture. 
although – as to be discussed below - export licensing formally exists, those autho-
rizations are virtually automatic in most cases.  export prohibitions and taxes are 
used sparingly. For example, in May 2001 an export tax amounting to 9 percent of 
the exported FOB value was established for all exports of bovine leather and hides. 
The stated reason for its imposition was provide protection to those industries, espe-
cially shoes, using leather as an input.  at the same time an export tax of 55 percent 
was announced for arms and munitions exports to South and Central america. 
anti-Export Bias.  an anti-export bias in economic policies can be ascertained and 
examined through a comparison of the incentives for production for domestic sales 
and those for producing for export sales.  Since tariffs are, on the average, higher 
quantitatively than any existent incentives for export sales, an anti-export bias for 
Brazil is evident, coming from the exercise of government policies. The logical policy 
implication arising from this observation is not to provide subsidies to exports but 
rather to reduce some of the disincentives for those exports and, as well as, to conti-
nue to reduce the incentives for domestic market sales through the pursuit of further 
tariff decreases. This is a policy approach that has worked in other countries. 
5  SeCeX, Relatório dEcoM 2000, p. 29.
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3   soME oBsERvEd EffEcts of tRadE PolIcIEs and tRadE PolIcy 
lIBERalIzatIon
a.  Productivity growth
Productivity growth has long been recognized as a driving force in a country’s 
economic growth.  The most simple measure of productivity – the value of output 
divided by labor inputs – enables facile cross-country comparisons, which clearly 
show that developing countries, including Brazil, have much lower productivity 
levels than the more advanced industrial countries.  Catching up involves increasing 
productivity levels, i.e., productivity growth. Studies of labor productivity growth 
for Brazil show reasonably high productivity growth for Brazil during the 1970, 
especially during the boom years of the early 1970s, followed by very slow produc-
tivity growth during the problematic 1980s and then fairly rapid labor productivity 
growth during the 1990s.6
The problem with labor productivity measurements is that they do not capture the 
contribution of non-labor factors of production and therefore overstate the contribu-
tion of labor alone.  More complete and recent work has attempted to include non-
labor factors, especially capital, and focus on the concept of total factor productivity 
(TFP).  Several recent studies show high aggregate TFP growth for Brazil during 
the 1970s followed by low, or even negative, TFP growth in the 1980s.7  Brazil’s 
experience is similar to that of other Latin american countries, although Brazilian 
TFP growth during the 1970s seems to have been especially robust. 
Most studies of total factor productivity use fairly highly aggregated data for the 
empirical estimates.  While illustrative, more complete analysis can be provided by 
the use of data at the enterprise level over time.  Some recent estimates using such 
information are presented in Table 4.  The important thing demonstrated by these 
– and other studies – is that the low productivity growth in the 1980s was followed 
by more rapid productivity growth in the 1990s. 
6 For representative work for the industrial sector, see Braga and rossi (1988), Bonelli (1998) and Bonelli 
and Fonseca (1998).  
7 See, for example, De Gregorio and Lee (1999), Bonelli and Fonseca (1998), Gomes (2001) and Bacha 
and Bonelli (2004) for some representative estimates.  
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taBlE 4 - EstIMatEs of annualIzEd tfP gRoWth In BRazIlIan 
ManufactuRIng, 1987-98, (In %)
Period Muendler et al.a Gomes
1987-90 - 0.81 - 2.49
1991-98   0.29   5.99
Note:  a. Muendler et al. estimates are for 13 selected industries.
Source:  World Bank (2001).
The question that arises is why this turnaround in productivity growth occurred. 
a general explanation is that the economic reforms undertaken by Brazilian 
Governments beginning in 1990 changed the economic and investment climate. Two 
more specific explanations can also be posited: (a) foreign direct investment – stimu-
lated by the improved investment climate – induced higher productivity growth; and 
(b) the trade policy liberalization – as predicted by economic theory – had a salutary 
effect on productivity and the competitiveness of the Brazilian economy.   
Relationship with fdI.  as noted above, subsequent to the microeconomic reforms 
beginning in the early 1990s and the macroeconomic stabilization in the mid-1990s, 
net FDi flows to Brazil began to grow substantially. Questions include: (i) what is 
the nature of the relationship, if any?; and (ii) which way does any causality flow? 
Or is any relationship more complex than a simple bivariate one. a couple of studies 
for Brazil present some tentative, but inconclusive, evidence.
One recent analysis by Moreira (1999) presents evidence showing a strong posi-
tive relationship between the growth of labor productivity across manufacturing 
industries and the participation of foreign capital in those industries for the period 
1990-97.  another study (Bonelli, 1998), while addressing productivity questions, 
has focused on the related concept of competitiveness, as measured by unit labor 
costs.8  its conclusion is that competitiveness increases (declines in unit labor costs) 
are only partially associated with FDi growth or FDi presence in a given manufac-
turing industry.  it should be noted that both these studies are based on aggregated 
industry comparisons within Brazil.  The estimates are generally inconclusive and 
indicative that the relationship between productivity growth and FDi is more com-
plex than can be satisfactorily explained by a simple bivariate analysis. One is forced 
to search for other explanations for the high observed Brazilian productivity growth 
in the 1990s.
8 The numerical relationship between labor productivity (Q/L), and competitiveness (as measured by 
unit labor costs, or Q/L) and average wages (W/L) is a definitional one from which the importance of 
productivity growth for competitiveness is easily discerned.
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Relationship with trade Policy liberalization.  in the case of the relationship between 
productivity growth and trade policy liberalization, the questions are the same as 
posed with foreign direct investment.  There are however strong theoretical grounds 
to posit a causal relationship.  a more competitive market environment resulting 
from trade policy liberalization is expected to stimulate productivity enhancements. 
Without such productivity (and competitiveness) gains firms run the risk of failure. 
The inducements to adjust to the more open trade policy regime are compelling. 
also, liberalized and greater imports, especially of intermediate and capital goods, 
are likely to embody improved technology, which in turn may stimulate productivity 
growth. Finally, unlike the case with FDi, there are a number of empirical studies 
for Brazil that have concluded that trade policy liberalization has resulted in produc-
tivity improvements on the part of Brazilian industry. 
a study by Hay (2001), using data at the enterprise level for a sample of large 
Brazilian industrial firms, has presented evidence that the reduction of non-tariff 
barriers and tariffs in the early 1990s had significant positive effects on TFP growth. 
Similar effects were found for deregulation and privatization.  a study by rossi and 
Ferreira (1999) produced comparable conclusions; a strong impact of the reduction 
of nominal and effective protection was observed on the growth of aggregate TFP 
growth.  another study (SiLVa, 2000), using data from a large sample of firms, 
also found evidence to support the hypothesis that the trade liberalization prompted 
increases in labor productivity. 
The most ambitious and complete study analyzing the dimensions of TFP growth 
in Brazil is that of Muendler et al. (2001).  Using data at the enterprise level, es-
timates were first made for firm level TFP and TFP growth. This permitted the 
analysis of TFP in relationship to other firm and industry characteristics. a very 
clear relationship emerged between TFP growth and trade liberalization, leading to 
the conclusion that the import liberalization in the early 1990s played a major role 
in stimulating productivity growth.  
This evidence for Brazil on the link between trade liberalization and productivity is 
consistent with that from other countries.9 in Mexico, for example, a recent study 
(World Bank, 1999) found that there was a strong association at the industry level 
between TFP growth, on the one hand, and export orientation (as measured by the 
ratio of exports to total sales), on the other. 
in sum, economic theory predicts that trade policy liberalization will result in higher 
productivity and TFP growth. The available empirical evidence shows that this has 
indeed been the case with the Brazilian experience.
9   See edwards (1998).
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b. disappointing Export growth
economic theory also predicts that trade policy liberalization will result in increased 
exports and improved export performance. This has not been the case. The question 
is why. Before addressing that question, an overview of Brazil’s export performance 
is necessary.
in comparison with most other countries – and especially the more advanced eco-
nomies – Brazil’s export growth has been lackluster.  Over the past fifty years there 
has been an unprecedented expansion in world trade.  Many countries have been 
able to reap the benefits of such an expansion through their own accelerated gro-
wth.  Brazil however has been left behind.  as observed in Figure 1, its share of 
total world exports has declined over the past fifty years, falling from over 2 percent 
of the total in 1948 to less than 1 percent by 2000 (considerably less than its share 
in total world GDP). Figure 1 also presents for comparison purposes Mexico and 
China.  While starting from lower levels than Brazil in the late 1940s, by 2000 both 
had far surpassed Brazil’s share of world exports.  
fIguRE 1 – PERcEntagE shaREs In total WoRld ExPoRts, 1948-
2000
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 Source: WTO, International trade statistics, 2001.
Brazil’s export performance, so important to diminish the country’s external vul-
nerability as well as to promote productivity growth – has been lackluster since the 
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end of the 1970s.10  During the 1990s total exports in nominal US dollars grew by 
only 5.8 percent annually. (Table 5)  in comparison with other countries, Brazil’s 
export performance also appears mediocre.  Many countries have benefited from the 
sustained boom in world trade over the past forty years, but Brazil – despite some 
spurts of rapid export growth, especially of manufactures – has not.  a comparison 
of Brazil with China and Mexico – two countries discussed above and also with a 
strong FDi attraction - is presented in Figure 2. Compared to China and Mexico, 
Brazil’s exports have stagnated. in addition to its stagnation, Brazil’s ratio of exports 
to GDP is among the very lowest in the world. The question is why Brazil has done 
so poorly in its export performance.
explaining Brazil’s mediocre export performance up to the early 1990s is relatively 
simple – heavy handed domestic market protection (including de facto import pro-
hibitions and prohibitive tariffs of over 100 percent).11  But why was export perfor-
mance so poor during the 1990s?  after all, there had been a sweeping trade liberal-
ization in the early 1990s, and the experience elsewhere, plus theoretical reasoning, 
would indicate that a considerable increase in exports would occur. it did not. The 
answer lies in the conduct of macroeconomic policies. The macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion program embodied in the Plano Real beginning in 1994 used the exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor, resulting in substantial real currency appreciation. Such 
appreciation effectively short-circuited the export response.  in addition, as also to 
be expected from the international experience, increasing real currency appreciation 
led to a partial backsliding on the trade liberalization, thus undermining further 
the export impetus. The problem of currency overvaluation disappeared with the 
establishment of a floating exchange rate regime in January 1999 and the subsequent 
depreciation. after a quite respectable export performance in 2000 (total export 
growth of 15 percent, with manufactures growing at 19 percent), export growth in 
2001 (when total exports grew by only 5.7 percent) and in 2002 was disappointing. 
The reasons for this lackluster behavior in 2001 and 2002 seem to lie in the fall in 
key commodity prices, recession in the major industrial markets and instability in 
the important argentine market. More recently, exports have been growing strongly, 
with export growth of 21 percent in 2003, 32 percent in 2004 and then falling 
slightly to 23 percent in 2005. it may finally be that after the delay afforded by the 
overvaluation episode (related to the implementation of the Plano Real) the effects of 
the trade policy liberalization of the early 1990s are finally being felt. More recently 
however (2005-2007) the ongoing real appreciation of the real appears to have been 
undermining these effects on export performance. The country’s manufacturing 
10 a discussion of Brazil’s export performance and the related policy environment is contained in Tyler 
(2003).
11 a number of studies have presented evidence in support of this argument. See, for example, Bergsman 
(1970), Tyler (1976, 1985) and Braga et al. (1988).
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export growth has been dampened, with nominal US$ growth rates falling from an 
average of 25.6 percent for 2003-05 to 14.7 percent in 2006, with further growth 
erosion observed for the first half on 2007.12 Overall export performance, led by 
Brazil’s primary products, has benefited however by an international commodity 
price boom, which has offset the adverse effects of the currency appreciation. 
taBlE 5 - annual ExPoRt gRoWth R atEs foR MaJoR PRoduct 
catEgoRIEs, 1964-2006 (%)
Period Primary Semi-Manufactured Manufactured Total Exports
1970-1980 15.3 25.2 36.0 22.1
1980-1990 0.3   8.1   6.5   4.5
1990-2000 3.7   5.2   6.7   5.8
2000-2006 21.4  14.9 14.9 16.5
1964-2006 8.7  13.0 17.4 11.5
Note: calculated from export values expressed in nominal US$.
Source: SeCeX data on its MDiC website (www.desenvolvimento.gov.br). 
fIguRE 2 – ExPoRts as a PERcEntagE of gdP foR BRazIl, chIna 
and MExIco, 1970-2001 (In %)
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Source: Computed from World Bank SiMa data, quoted by Herrera, 2002. 
12 SeCeX data as available on www.desenvolvimento.gov.br.  Offsetting the slowing manufactured export 
growth has been stronger primary product export growth. On an annual basis growth for these exports 
was more than 31 percent for the first six months of 2007. 
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The experience with Brazilian macroeconomic policies in the period following the 
trade policy liberalization illustrates the importance of analytically isolating different 
effects.  a computable general equilibrium (CGe) model can help do this. Such a 
framework, despite its complications, has been chosen for this study.
4  sIMulatIons of BRazIlIan tRadE PolIcy changEs usIng a 
coMPutaBlE gEnERal EquIlIBRIuM (cgE) ModEl 
Why use a cgE Model?  in recent years theoretical and computational advances have 
permitted the development and use of computable general equilibrium (CGe) mo-
dels for economic analysis. Some features of these models render them quite suitable 
for studying the effect of trade policy changes and arrangements. Quantification of 
the effects of trade policy changes is desirable in order to best assess the magnitudes 
of effects, the trade-offs and benefits/costs to different policy alternatives. One area 
where CGe models have been recently used is in the analysis of effects stemming 
from differing regional trade agreements (rTas), as for example a free trade agree-
ment between different countries.  
Major features of cgE Models.  Over the past twenty years the use of CGe models 
has become commonplace in order to assess the effects – both direct and indirect 
– of economic shocks or policy changes. advances in computational techniques 
have facilitated the use of such models. The basic idea underlying a CGe modeling 
exercise is relatively simple. it involves: (a) the construction of a mathematical model 
of an economy; (b) the collection of data for a time period for those variables for 
which data are available; (c) calibration and solution of the model mathematically 
to establish the initial equilibrium values; (d) imposition of a shock to the initial 
equilibrium in the form of some exogenous event, such as a policy change; and (e) 
the observation of simulations derived from the introduction of the shock on various 
variable values.  
CGe models are founded on Walrasian general equilibrium theory in which market 
prices and quantities are simultaneously determined. economic agents comprising 
firms, households and government make economic decisions related to production 
and consumption for different goods and services. equilibrium conditions are es-
tablished in the multiple goods and services markets such that demand and supply 
conditions determine prices and quantities.  Factor markets – generally specified as 
land (for agriculture), capital and labor – are similarly specified.  CGe models are 
general in the sense that they include all the economy’s sectors and economic agents. 
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Consequently, upon solution all the effects – direct and indirect – of a given shock 
can be assessed. 
The advantages in the use of CGe models for policy simulations are several. First, 
such models are based upon solid microeconomic theoretical foundations.  Second, 
they are complete in that they model the entire economy and can be used to capture 
and estimate total effects, taking into account interdependencies and linkages imbed-
ded in the functioning of the economy.  Third, CGe models generate quantifiable 
results for the impact of policy changes, including for output, resource allocation, 
and welfare. income distributional implications can also be simulated. Fourth, since 
policy impacts are quantitatively estimated, analyses of alternative policy packages 
can be assessed and ranked in a consistent framework. Fifth, CGe models are well 
suited to analyze major policy changes as opposed to the marginal changes analyzed 
in a partial equilibrium framework. 
While the advantages of CGe models are compelling, serious shortcomings are 
also present.  First, CGe models require massive and detailed data inputs, building 
upon an elaborate social accounting matrix framework, including household con-
sumer surveys, national account information, fiscal data, trade flow and restriction 
information, etc., for the multiple regions (or countries) being modeled. Since the 
reliability of such secondary data is often questionable, models employing such data 
to construct a benchmark period equilibrium possess no real means to test the model 
structure, as is frequently possible with the statistical testing of econometric models. 
Moreover, the simulation results will be heavily dependent upon the benchmark year 
data, as well as the model parameters and any other related assumptions.  Second, 
the aggregation in CGe models, normally mandated by data limitation consider-
ations, may mask important effects in any simulation.  in other words, sectoral detail 
can not reasonably be expected from CGe models.  Third, the more elaborate and 
detailed the CGe model, the more likely it is to become a “black box” for which re-
sult interpretation is difficult. Fourth, there is no time dimension in a CGe model. 
The supposition is that with the imposed shock (e.g., policy change) the economy 
moves from one equilibrium to another. How long this adjustment takes is a mat-
ter of judgment. Fifth, there is no financial sector in CGe models. Sixth, and very 
importantly, despite efforts to dynamize CGe models, they are essentially compara-
tive static models.  Finally, some important effects of trade policy changes may be 
non-economic or political; these effects can not be quantified and are therefore not 
captured by CGe models. These problems notwithstanding, CGe models are now 
also widely used by governments to assess the impacts of policy changes.13  
13 a recent survey estimated that government CGe modeling capability and use were present in at least 
20 countries around the world. See Devarajan and robinson (2002).
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CGe models have proved useful in analyzing the effects of trade policy changes.  in 
particular, they have been employed for examining ex ante the expected economic ef-
fects of alternative trade policies, including unilateral trade reform, multilateral trade 
liberalization, and different proposed preferential trading arrangements. analysis 
can be conducted on a country specific basis or worldwide. it can also be focused 
on specific sectors or sector groupings. Some recent examples include, inter alia: 
anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugge (2005) on the expected impacts of the 
Doha round trade liberalization on developing countries; Fugazza and Vanzetti 
(2005) on the possible effects of South-South preferential trading arrangements; 
anderson et al. (2007) on the effects of distortions to agricultural incentives in 
Latin america; Ferreira Filho and Horridge (2005) and Bussolo et al. (2005) on 
the possible effects of the Doha round on poverty in Brazil; Gurgel (2006) for an 
analysis of Brazilian agrobusiness trade likely to result from the Doha round; and 
Gurgel (2007) on trade agreements and their possible impacts on family agriculture 
in Brazil.  
cgE Model used. The CGe model used in the exercise has been adopted from others 
that have been developed and used by the World Bank.14 it employs features of the 
Global Trade analysis Project (GTaP) model, and importantly it makes use of the 
GTaP database, specifically the fifth version of the updated and expended database, 
termed GTaP5. important characteristics of the model stem from closure routines, 
mainly that: (i) the exchange rate adjusts to ensure current account stability (main-
taining the initial observed, and presumably financable, current account deficit; 
and (ii) factor prices adjust to clear the market, in effect ensuring full employment 
of factors.  
The model is a comparative static, constant returns to scale, multiregional and multi-
sectoral quantitative model. in order to assess the impact of trade policy changes 
on trade flows, the CGe model divides the world into a number of regions. For the 
Brazil model, a number of regions, in addition to Brazil, have been incorporated, 
including argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, the remainder of Latin america, the US, 
Canada, the european Union and Japan. For most purposes of the analysis, the rest 
of the world beyond Brazil is lumped together. Factors of production included in the 
model include land, unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital and natural resources.
The sectors specified for the model have had to conform to the GTaP5 dataset. The 
latter includes 57 sectors, but some aggregations have been undertaken; the version 
used for our simulations contains 22 sectors. Because most of the documentation of 
14 See various CGe model applications developed for the World Bank by Harrison et al. (1997, 2003) 
and rutherford et al. (1997, 1999).  With a few adaptations, this is also the model developed and used 
by Harrison et al. (2003) to estimate the effects of alternative regional trade policy arrangements for 
Brazil. This model is available at http://www.bus.ucf.edu/gharrison/data/cge/brazil.
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the data and model are available in Harrison et al. (2003), we summarize the main 
features here. 
Productive sectors seek to minimize costs subject to technological constraints. 
intermediate inputs and primary factors (e.g., labor, capital, and land) are used. 
Value added combines primary factors in a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
intermediate inputs and aggregated value added are used in a Leontief production 
function. each intermediate input is a composite of domestic and imported goods, 
combined through a CeS function. Primary factors are specified as mobile across 
sectors within a region but immobile internationally. The amount of capital, labor 
and land available to any economy is fixed. Output is differentiated between domes-
tic output and exports in a Constant elasticity Transformation (CeT) function, but 
exports are not differentiated by destination country. 
each region has a single representative consumer who maximizes utility, as well 
as a single government agent. Demand is characterized by a nested armington 
structure for each of the sectors, which allow multi-stage budgeting. We consider a 
Cobb-Douglas demand function at the top level, among the 22 goods. Consumers 
first choose how much of each armington aggregate good to consume, subject to 
aggregate incomes and composite prices of the aggregate goods. The armington 
aggregate good is a constant elasticity of substitution (CeS) composite of domestic 
production and aggregate imports. Consumers then decide how much to spend on 
aggregate imports and the domestic good subject to the prior decision of how much 
income will be spent on each individual sector. Preferences for aggregate imports 
and domestic goods are represented by a CeS utility function. Finally, consumers 
decide how to allocate expenditures across imports from the other regions based on 
their CeS utility function for imports from different regions and income allocated 
to consumption of imports from the previous higher level decision. 
So that government revenue remains unchanged in any counterfactual scenario, a tax 
is imposed to compensate for lost tariff revenue. each country has a balance of trade 
constraint, so that any change in the value of imports is matched by an equal value 
change in exports. The model is “real,” in the sense that it contains no financial 
assets. Thus there is only a “real” exchange rate, defined as the price of a country’s 
tradable goods relative to the price of its nontradable goods. The model does not 
incorporate increasing returns to scale or endogenous productivity effects of trade 
policy, despite a number of studies by Brazilian researchers identifying a correlation 
between the opening of Brazil to external trade in the early 1990s and an increase 
in productivity in Brazilian manufacturing.
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a major difficulty was in calibrating the model with Brazilian data, since the data for 
Brazil in the original GTaP5 data set were out-of-date and in some cases suspect.15 
The 1996 iBGe input-output table has been introduced, with some adjustments, 
into the GTaP database, replacing the original GTaP Brazilian data. The GTaP5 
database uses trade statistics from 1997, and some adjustments were necessary to 
conform the Brazilian i-O data to the trade data, and vice versa. Trade restrictions 
are measured by tariffs.16 For the “base year” of 1996/7 the common external tariff 
(CeT) for MerCOSUL was used, with Brazil specific exceptions. The tariff line 
information was used to map into the 57 GTaP sectors. Similar procedures, em-
ploying tariff line information from the Brazilian Tariff Nomenclature existing at 
the time, were used to estimate the 1989 tariff levels, i.e., before the trade policy 
liberalization.  
it is important to highlight the differences of our model in relation to previous stud-
ies. The most important advance in our modeling exercise compared to others (e.g., 
CarNeirO; arBaCHe (2002) and Barros et al. (2000)) is the use of a multi-
regional model instead of a single region model. This means we include endogenous 
effects in terms of output and trade from commercial partners. although our ap-
proach may not bring considerable differences in the results, it is a more complete 
way to represent the effects and feedbacks among several economies when a policy 
change involving trade exercise is simulated. it becomes more important when we 
deal with trade openness among countries with considerable participation in the to-
tal trade flows of each other. This is indeed the case of Brazil and its MerCOSUL 
partners. Other differences of our model compared to the models used by Carneiro 
and arbache and Barros et al. are related to: (i)  assumptions about employment and 
labor market (as we deal with long run); and (ii) the sectoral aggregation (we have 
a more detailed and complete representation of the agricultural sectors).   
solution algorithm. The model is formulated in the software GaMS (BrOOKe et 
al., 1998), using the MPSGe programming language, developed by rutherford 
(1999). MPSGe uses the benchmark equilibrium of the Social account Matrix 
and assigned elasticities to express the CGe model as a Mixed Complimentarity 
Problem (MCP) (MaTHieSeN, 1985), in terms of equations representing zero 
profit, market clearance and income balance conditions. MPSGe uses the solver 
PaTH, developed by to solve MCP problems.
15 The Brazilian data for the GTaP5 database relies on the 1985 Brazilian input-output data 
(WaLMSLey; MCDOUGaLL, 2001). 
16 This is mostly a problem for the pre-reform period, when nontariff barriers were extensive. it might 
be thus argued that tariffs did not suitably reflect all the protection effects. On the other hand, it has 
been observed that in many instances “water” existed in the tariff rates. (Tyler, 1985) The joint effect 
of tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other trade restrictions was to effectively isolate many Brazilian goods 
from international markets, turning ostensibly tradable goods into effective non-tradables. 
William tyler, angelo costa gurgel 79
Est. econ., são Paulo, 39(1): 59-88, jan-mar 2009
Estimating Procedures and Rationale. The analytical objective in the case at hand is to 
assess the economic changes, primarily in social welfare, resultant from the partial 
trade policy liberalization beginning in 1989 and continuing until roughly 1994. a 
point of departure in using a CGe model to better understand the effects of an eco-
nomic policy change is the assumption that the economy is at a rough equilibrium 
before the simulated policy change. With the introduction of the quantified policy 
change (shock, or in this case the change in tariff levels) the economy as modeled 
in the CGe framework moves to a new equilibrium. Thus, the introduced “shock 
vector” consisted of the 1989 tariff levels, thereby simulating a reversion to 1989 
tariffs. New variable values are then measured to gauge the effect of the policy chan-
ge. in this case the initial equilibrium point is not the pre-trade liberalization period 
of 1989, with the introduction of the new, liberalized and lower tariffs. rather our 
initial point is the post-liberalization period of 1996/7, with the CGe model calibra-
ted with data from that period. The “shock” comes in introducing the 1989 tariffs 
into the economy. What would happen if the clock were set back and the 1989 levels 
of tariff protection were reintroduced? The mirror images of the effects simulated 
by such an exercise are the effects of the 1989 liberalization. For instance, a loss in 
economic welfare in reverting to 1989 tariff levels certeris paribus is equivalent to a 
commensurate gain in welfare resulting from the liberalization from 1989 tariffs to 
those prevailing in 1997 (also roughly the same as existing in 2004).
simulation Results. The main results are presented in Table 6. With the simulated 
reintroduction of 1989 tariff levels, welfare – as measured by real consumption 
levels17 – is simulated to decline by 1.9 percent (under the central elasticity assump-
tions) and is equivalent to a deadweight loss of US$9.7 billion for the economy. This 
clearly suggests comparable – and large – welfare gains emanating from the trade 
policy liberalization in the early 1990s.18 By way of comparison of the magnitudes, 
Harrison et al. (2003), using basically the same model, estimated that if Brazil were 
to unilaterally reduce its 1997 tariff levels by 50 percent, the comparable welfare 
gain would be 0.4 percent. This suggests that the larger positive effect resulted from 
the earlier and actual trade liberalization.  
in addition to the welfare losses stemming from the simulated reversion to 1989 
tariff levels, the high protection levels would afford a real currency appreciation of 
9.1 percent. Conversely, a real depreciation of a comparable amount should have 
occurred with the early 1990s liberalization. This in fact was not allowed to occur 
and continued currency overvaluation was sustained through the pursuit of Brazilian 
17 The change in welfare is the Hicksian equivalent variation. We report it as a percent of consumption.
18 The model simulation also shows a fall in argentine welfare (1.3 percent) as a result of a reversion to 
1989 tariff levels, suggesting that argentina also benefited substantially as a result of the Brazilian 
trade liberalization in the early 1990s.
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macroeconomic policies,19 thereby effectively short-circuiting the expected export 
expansion and the concomitant welfare increases. 
taBlE 6 – EffEcts of a REvERsIon to 1989 taRIff lEvEls, changEs 
ExPREssEd In %
Low a Central b
Welfare Gains (where negative indicates Losses) - 0.69 - 1.91
Real Exchange Rate - 9.13 - 9.06
Return to Skilled Labor - 2.06 - 4.14
Return to Capital - 1.44 - 1.32
Return to Natural Resources -10.74 - 17.26
Notes: a. Low elasticity20 assumptions include:
 elast icity of substitution between domestical ly produced goods and imports = 4 
e la s t ic i t y  o f  subs t i t ut ion  be t ween i mpor t s  o f  d i f fe rent  cou nt r ie s  = 8 
elasticity of transformation between domestic goods and exports = 5 
 b. Central elasticity assumptions include:
 elasticity of substitution between domestical ly produced goods and imports = 15 
e la s t ic i t y  of  subst i t ut ion be t ween impor t s  of  d i f ferent  cou nt r ie s  = 30 
elasticity of transformation between domestic goods and exports = 5 
Source: authors’ estimates.
The simulated change in the returns to factors coming from the reversion to 1989 
tariff levels shows reductions for the returns to skilled labor, capital and natural 
resources, with the later being particularly adversely effected. in the case of capital, 
under the central elasticities case, the return to capital falls less than welfare in ge-
neral suggesting that the protection system existing prior to 1989 benefited capital 
proportionately. With the trade liberalization beginning in 1989, factor returns were 
increased, particularly for natural resources, reflecting the country’s comparative 
advantage, which had been previously suppressed by the protection system.
19 annex Figure 1 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate over the period in question.  See also 
Ferreira (2002). 
20  The use of two alternative sets of elasticities allow us to rely in a range of results without add the 
complication of presenting results from sensitivity analysis. regarding the elasticity levels, reidel 
(1988) and athukorala and reidel (1994) argue that when the model is properly specified the demand 
elasticities are not statistically different from infinity, and their point estimates are close to the central 
elasticity values we have used, as are those employed in the study of Harrison et. al. (2003).
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The sector changes as revealed from the simulations are largely as expected. Table 
7 presents some sectoral results. in general, with the reversion to 1989 tariff levels, 
the simulations show: (a) a changing production composition with increases in ou-
tput occurring in many manufacturing activities and declines occurring generally 
in agriculturally-based products and light manufacturing; (b) increases in most 
consumer and final product prices; and (c) generalized decreases in trade flows, both 
for exports and imports. Conversely, these results suggest opposite effects certeris 
paribus for the early-1990s trade liberalization. economic welfare, as reflected in real 
consumption levels, is seen to have increased as a result of the trade reforms. Sectors 
experiencing output increasing effects, notwithstanding other policy effects, were 
oil seeds, vegetable oils, meat products, petroleum, sugar, leather products, wood 
products and other light manufacturing products. The most negatively impacted 
sectors from the trade liberalization were seemingly motor vehicles and parts and 
electronic equipment. Trade flows – for both exports and imports – were stimulated 
by the trade policy reforms. in general, exports showed greater expansionary effects 
in those sectors with the greatest increases in output.
in terms of results, in general our model gives somewhat similar results in terms of 
growth, output and trade flows as those obtained in previous studies, such as those 
of Barros et al. (2000) and Carneiro and arbache (2002). However, we report larger 
positive welfare changes associated with the trade liberalization. This is due to: (i) 
the higher elasticities we have used; and (ii) other differences in the specified and 
estimated CeG model. For example, the endogenous effects and feedbacks from 
other countries in our multi-regional model help to produce larger simulated chan-
ges. in this way, an increase (decrease) in Brazil’s tariffs on imports from argentina 
has the immediate effect of not only reducing (increasing) Brazilian imports but 
also argentina’s exports and production, which in turn reduce (increase) even more 
the trade flows from that country to Brazil. Other results such as the changes in the 
remuneration of primary factors are difficult to compare, since those other studies 
have pursued more focused and detailed analyses of labor markets and their short 
run rigidities. Our modeling exercise, on the other hand, assumes an approxima-
tion toward long run equilibrium in labor markets, trending towards full factor 
employment. 
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taBlE 7 – sEctoRal EffEcts of a REvERsIon to 1989 taRIff lEvEls, 
changEs ExPREssEd In %
Changes in 
Production
Changes in Exports Changes in Imports
Sector Low Central Low Central Low Central
Paddy Rice 0.30 3.04   -29.98 -63.62
Cereal Grains 4.83 24.80 -24.57 -24.19 -33.21 -83.84
Oil Seeds -8.95 -12.32 -27.49 -37.50 -32.71 -78.08
Sugar Cane & Beets -2.74 -3.80     
Other Crops, n.e.c. -0.08 3.05 -25.84 -29.16 -27.60 -75.24
Bovine Cattle, Sheep & Horses, etc. -0.08 2.89   -33.02 -74.17
Animal Products, n.e.c. -3.02 -3.29 -27.43 -36.02 -29.92 -79.13
Raw Milk 0.62 1.42     
Oil -10.59 -25.89 -26.47 -35.13 30.64 72.66
Minerals, n.e.c. -4.46 2.89 -23.75 -23.82 -26.82 -76.56
Bovine Meat Products -0.48 1.81 -25.85 -30.34 -18.15 -46.38
Meat Products, n.e.c. -4.59 -6.74 -27.82 -35.53 1.02 -42.84
Vegetable Oils & Fats -12.70 -19.57 -30.36 -43.81 16.16 14.85
Dairy Products 1.25 3.93   -24.35 -59.48
Processed Rice 1.60 4.68   -51.38 -91.89
Sugar -5.48 -7.87 -27.03 -34.70   
Food Products, n.e.c. -0.06 1.69 -27.78 -32.89 -39.74 -89.01
Textiles 4.92 9.07 -28.43 -35.46 -74.77 -99.70
Wearing Apparel 0.58 2.15 -30.38 -40.83 -72.77 -99.58
Leather Products -6.89 -0.46 -32.65 -35.41 -39.90 -86.75
Lumber & Wood Products -2.56 -2.51 -27.21 -33.64 -20.61 -64.59
Paper Products & Publishing -0.17 2.59 -27.42 -31.94 -35.85 -85.32
Petroleum & Coal Products 6.51 16.67 -11.78 -2.84 -24.32 -78.00
Chemicals, Rubber & plastics 7.65 14.50 -26.24 -29.41 -53.67 -96.68
Mineral Products, n.e.c. 1.31 3.14 -26.62 -33.38 -46.46 -93.18
Ferrous Metals -0.96 10.57 -29.42 -31.30 -44.90 -92.96
Metals, n.e.c. 4.33 21.02 -28.10 -23.36 -46.36 -93.62
Metal Products 2.83 11.46 -28.81 -34.38 -36.92 -86.33
Motor Vehicles and Parts 2.47 48.41 -30.48 -17.09 -27.26 -57.40
Electronic Equipment 16.61 40.97 -26.98 -18.22 -36.74 -90.66
Machinery & Equipment, n.e.c. 9.04 21.08 -25.47 -25.09 -40.13 -90.38
Services -1.14 -4.64 -27.00 -31.79 47.43 211.21
Note: Simulation results with low and central elasticity assumptions are presented separately.
Source: authors’ calculations.
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5  concludIng oBsERvatIons
The available empirical evidence supports the contention that the partial trade lib-
eralization of the early 1990s has had salutary effects on the Brazilian economy. 
Widespread productivity gains have been observed, with indications of direct links 
to the trade liberalization and other related policy reforms.  The CGe model simu-
lations reported in this paper have the advantage that they examine solely trade 
policy changes, not the remaining constellation of policies which unquestionably 
affected economic outcomes for the period in question. Our results suggest sig-
nificant welfare gains for the Brazilian economy stemming from the trade policy 
liberalization.  
a less tangible, non-economic effect of the trade policy liberalization in the early 
1990s also warrants some mention in passing. Brazil’s isolation in international 
goods markets was put to an end. The Brazilian consumer was suddenly confronted 
by much wider product choice and variety. Today products are available – produced 
by both domestic and foreign establishments –  that simply did not exist in the 
country previously. Trade policies prior to 1990 had effectively cut off Brazil from 
the world. That is no longer the case. 
as argued above, the trade liberalization which took place in the early 1990s was 
partial in nature and partly reversed in the late-1990s, as pressures from macroeco-
nomic policies (the Plano Real mostly) built and protectionist interests regrouped. 
While the country is clearly much better off today as a result of the trade and other 
policy reforms, there are still gains to be made by further trade policy liberalization. 
recent work by Harrison et al (2003) and others document the potential gains for 
Brazil stemming from such trading arrangements as a Mercosul-european Union 
FTa, the FTaa (or aLCa), the probable Doha round outcomes, and trade lib-
eralization within MerCOSUL.21  This liberalization is also seen, according to 
the Harrison et al simulations, as being pro-poor in that it would both increase the 
wages of unskilled labor and decrease relative income inequality. 
21 in addition to the work by Harrison et al (2003), a recent paper by Cunha and Teixeira (2004) also uses 
a CGe framework to simulate effects for Brazil from the envisaged FTaa with comparable beneficial 
results for Brazil.  an unpublished study by Lia Vals Pereira (2000) also presents similar results for 
aLCa and a FTa with the eU. 
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annEx 
fIguRE 1 – REal EffEctIvE ExchangE RatE IndEx, Jan 1979-dEc 02 
(dEcEMBER 1998 = 100; IncREasE = REal dEPREcIatIon)
Note:  estimated on the basis of wholesale prices indices for Brazil and its 15 principal trading  partners 
with weights assigned by the partners’ shares in Brazil’s total exports.  
Source: compiled from iPea data and estimations, as reported on the iPea website.
